House Funders Critical of TSA, Handling of Sensitive Security Information
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE REPORT
House Report 109-79 - To accompany H.R. 2360
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION DESIGNATION
The General Accountability Office (GAO) recently completed a review of the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Sensitive Security Information designation process. GAO found that TSA has no clear SSI designation policies and procedures, that TSA has no monitoring controls on SSI designations, and that TSA has insufficient training for employees on SSI designation. In addition, TSA has not officially limited the number of TSA staff who can designate SSI documents, so in essence all TSA employees currently may designate a document as SSI.
The Committee finds this situation completely unacceptable. The Committee expects the Department to try to release as much, not as little, information to the public as possible. The current situation at TSA provides for a large amount of information to be prevented from public disclosure with no oversight of the designation to be prevented from public disclosure with no oversight of the designation process.
Therefore, the Committee expects the headquarters Office of Security to develop SSI policies and procedures Department-wide. The Committee withholds $10,000,000 from the Office of Security until a report is provided to the Committee on the number of documents designated as SSI today, Department-wide SSI designation policies and procedures, and the total number of staff able to designate SSI within the Department. The ensure consistency, the Committee expects the Department and TSA to limit the number of employees able to designate information as SSI. The Committee has included a cop of sixty on the number of people within TSA able to designate SSI information.
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
In the statement of managers accompanying the fiscal year 2005 Appropriations Act for DHS, the conferees directed the Secretary to submit a five-year integrated strategic transportation security plan. To date, the Committee has not received this plan. Without such a plan, the Committee remains concerned that the Department has concentrated homeland security funding and technology on aviation security, without placing equal resources on securing the Nation’s rail lines, tunnels, bridges, and ports. The Committee directs the Department to submit a report no later than January 16, 2006, on what progress has been made in securing this critical infrastructure, outlining a 5-year plan to achieve this objective. This report shall include how: infrastructure is identified; vulnerability assessments are accomplished; technologies are identified, tested, and deployed; funding is targeted; cooperation with private infrastructure owners is achieved; and progress in securing this infrastructure is measured. The Department shall accomplish this report in consultation with the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, the Science and Technology Directorate, the Transportation Security Administration, the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, the United States Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
INTERACTION WITH CONGRESS
The Committee continues to be frustrated by the Department’s inability to respond quickly, or at all, to items of Congressional interest or direction. Agencies throughout the Department have not submitted reports on time. Some notable examples include: (1) the Coast Guard’s failure to submit a Deepwater rebaseline that meets statutory requirements, such as an acquisition timeline for each new and/or legacy asset over the 20 to 25-year program, funding projections for each year of the program, and detailed descriptions of the revised mission needs requirements; (2) an inability to provide Congress with a plan to re-open National Airport to charter, business, and general aviation aircraft even though this has been requested multiple times, in multiple bills; and (3) failure to comply with language for the past two years that requires the Transportation Security Administration to submit quarterly reports on their plans to procure and install explosive detection systems at airports throughout the United States, as well as make other modifications, that will continue to permit these airports to screen 100-percent of checked baggage.
The Committee also continues to be frustrated with the lack of responsiveness from various agencies within the Department. Key questions that are asked are not followed up on. Requests for meetings are delayed or disregarded. Meetings to brief the Committee on high priority topics do not consistently involve the same Departmental officials which results in inconsistent, and often times contradictory, information being provided. While the Committee recognizes that there were growing pains when the Department was first formed and it might have been unclear which agency should respond to an inquiry, the Department is now over two years old. Responsiveness should no longer be a challenge. The Committee expects the Department to review its policies for handling of questions and requests for meetings. The current practice is unacceptable and it must change. In addition, the Department should make every effort to send the same knowledgeable staff to meetings, so that the information presented does not change randomly or selectively to suit a specific policy argument or audience.
Finally, there is a growing public perception that the Department is not making advances in key areas, particularly in the review, purchase, and installation of new technologies that might enhance security in the field. Repeatedly constituents tell Members of Congress that the Department is unwilling and very slow to meet with vendors and evaluate their technologies, or to purchase technology for deployment. It is critical that the Department make every effort to speed this process along. It is the sense of the Committee that the Department needs a robust and perhaps innovative technology transfer program that not only reviews technologies, but also helps get products into production and assures rapid use once built. The Committee addresses this issue further within the Office of the Under Secretary for Science and Technology (S&T) and provides $10,000,000 within S&T to ensure that the Department moves forward with its efforts to evaluate technologies, make those evaluations more transparent, and to expedite placement of workable solutions.
RESPONSIVENESS TO CONGRESS
The Committee is extremely frustrated in the Coast Guard’s apparent disregard for Congressional direction and has reduced funding for headquarters directorates by $5,000,000 accordingly. Reductions should be applied to the offices of the Commandant (G-C), Planning, Resources, and Procurement (CG-82), and Resource Management (CG-83). Some notable examples include: (1) the Coast Guard’s failure to submit a Deepwater re-baseline that meets the statutory requirements of Public Law 108-334, including a comprehensive timeline spanning the entire 20-25 year program that clearly shows the acquisition schedule of new assets and the phase-out and transition of legacy assets, funding projections for each year of the program, and that includes and fully incorporates detailed descriptions of the revised mission needs requirements; and (2) repeated problems with reprogramming submissions that fail to recognize Congressional actions in prior years or requests for funding for longstanding actions that the Coast Guard failed to include in their original budget submissions. The Committee cannot adequately oversee Coast Guard programs when the agency fails to answer basic questions or fails to provide timely and complete information.
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE OUTREACH AND PARTNERSHIPS
Of the funds recommended for Assessments and Evaluations, the Committee provides $62,177,000 for Critical Infrastructure Outreach and Partnerships, $5,000,000 below the President’s request and $44,415,000 below the amounts provided in fiscal year 2005. The private sector owns and operates more than 85 percent of the Nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources. Consequently, public-private cooperation is paramount. The goals of these partnerships include improving national planning, sharing protective actions, and enhancing outreach, education, training, and awareness. IAIP accomplishes these efforts through programs such as the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center, which maintains operational awareness of the National’s critical infrastructures and key resources and provides a mechanism and process for information sharing and coordination; the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information program, which provides assurance to private sector companies that information voluntarily submitted to the Department will be protected from release to the general public; the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, which provides the framework for implementing a coordinated, national infrastructure protection effort; and the Homeland Security Information Network-Critical Sector, which provides a secure national communication platform for all 13 critical infrastructure and 4 key resource sectors. The Committee notes that IAIP has failed to provide the report requested in House Report 108-541, on the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs). Fully functional ISACs are critical to enhance IAIP’s efforts to protect critical infrastructure. However, the Committee is unable to determine the level of ISAC support provided without this report. Therefore, the Committee recommends a $5,000,000 reduction to the Critical Infrastructure Outreach and Partnerships program for lack of responsiveness to Congressional direction.
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION
Of the funds recommended for Assessments and Evaluations, the Committee provides $77,173,000 for Critical Infrastructure Identification and Evaluation (CIIE), $5,000,000 above the President’s request and $688,000 below the amounts provided in fiscal year 2005. The mission of CIIE is to carry out comprehensive vulnerability assessments of critical infrastructure and key assets by identifying and analyzing assets and their vulnerabilities, developing protective methodologies and guidelines, and supporting special events. To accomplish these objectives, CIIE provides Protective Security Advisors to 60 urban areas to act as a local community liaison, verify assets submitted for inclusion to the National Asset Database (NADB), validate implementation of protective measures, convey threat advisories and specific warning information, and provide and coordinate critical infrastructure training; deploys Field Security Detachments to conduct site assistance visits and assist local law enforcement agencies in developing and implementing Buffer Zone Protection Plans; collates and catalogs common vulnerabilities and potential indicators of terrorist activities collected from site assistance visits; deploys Protective Security Task Forces during times of heightened alert to provide specialized security augmentation to designated high value, critical infrastructure targets and events; and maintains the NADB, which catalogues critical infrastructure nationwide.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF DAVID OBEY AND MARTIN OLAV SABO
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
The Administration’s approach to protecting critical infrastructure, such as ports, transit and railroad facilities, and chemical plants continues to frustrate us. Critical infrastructure is not evaluated objectively or with consistent expertise. A cynical person might wonder whether federal support for infrastructure protection is directly related to the amount of influence the particular industry or entity has with the White House.
With great fanfare, the President signed legislation requiring ports to assess their vulnerabilities and develop security plans. The requirements in this legislation were good first steps to minimize port vulnerabilities. The Coast Guard estimated in 2002 that $7 billion in infrastructure improvements and operating costs would be needed to improve port security. Congress has provided $737 million to improve port security since 2001. In that time, the Administration requested only $46 million, or six percent of this funding. No separate funding for port security was requested in the President’s 2006 budget. We are pleased that $150 million for port security is contained in this legislation.
Despite terrorist attacks on transit systems in Japan and Spain, less than $550 million has been provided to improve rail and transit security since September 11th. The transit industry estimates that $6 billion is needed for security training, radio communications systems, security cameras, and limiting access to sensitive facilities. Again, the President’s 2006 budget requested no separate funding for transit security. We are pleased that $150 million is contained in this legislation to improve transit security.
Last year the Department said that more transit security funds were not needed until the problem is better defined. How long must the American public wait for the Department to define the problem? The Department’s main accomplishment in rail and transit security is a directive to transit operators and railroads to continue their current security practices.
The Department of Homeland Security is the lead federal agency on chemical facility security. Yet, to our great frustration, the Department has set no deadlines to assess security vulnerabilities and implement security measures in these facilities.
The Government Accountability Office recommended in 2003 that the Administration develop a comprehensive national chemical security strategy. We still do not have one. The American taxpayer is paying for DHS staff and contractors to assess the vulnerabilities of the highest risk chemical facilities. We question why these private, profit-making companies cannot do their own assessments. In fact, many of them do have risk and vulnerability assessments because it makes good business sense, but they have not shared this information with the Department. While this legislation directs the Department to establish a national chemical security strategy, we remain concerned that the chemical sector is not getting the attention it deserves from this Administration and therefore, the American public remains subject to unnecessary risk.
AVIATION SECURITY
We are disappointed that the Administration continues to leave aviation security vulnerabilities unaddressed. The recent evacuation of the Capitol and the White House indicates that gaps remain in our aviation security system, despite having spent over $22 billion since September 11th on aviation security. The perimeters of passenger airports are not fully secured; it is not known how many of the general aviation security improvements suggested by TSA have been implemented; and most of air cargo is still not screened.
The cargo carried on passenger aircraft is not inspected like either the passengers or their baggage. Last October, Congress directed TSA to increase threefold the percentage of cargo carried on passenger aircraft that is screened. It is now seven months after this legislative requirement and TSA still has not acted to implement the law. We fully support provisions of this legislation that impose penalties to the TSA Administrator if this requirement is not implemented before the end of this fiscal year. We are also pleased that this legislation requires TSA to utilize downtime in their checked baggage screening operations to screen air cargo. Last, we are encouraged by the $30 million included for three air cargo-screening pilot projects, two at passenger airports and one at an all cargo airport.
The Administration is willing to give short shrift to the 9/11 Commission recommendations to screen all passengers and carry-on bags for explosives and to speed up the installation of in-line explosive detection systems. The Administration’s 2006 budget does not fund any additional in-line screening systems beyond the current eight approved airports. This legislation includes $101 million more for explosive detection system purchase and installation. This legislation also includes a provision mandating that recovered or deobligated TSA funds be used solely for additional explosive detection improvements.
Finally, we continue to be concerned that the air marshal program is not given a high enough funding priority by this Administration. The number of air marshals has decreased, and they still cannot communicate independently while they are in the air.
